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Abstract: The study looked into the association which exists amid financial statement 
fraud and governance among business organizations in Nigeria. A population of 122 
non-financial companies registered on Nigeria stock exchange was limited to 20 firms 
employing the rule of thumb based on stratified and simple random technique for a 
period of 2012-2016. The method of data analysis is panel regression. The dependent 
variable, fraud in the financial statement was measured using the Beneish M-score 
model while the independent variable was measured using audit committee 
independence, board structure. Findings show that an insignificant association exist 
amid audit committee independence, the composition of the board and financial 
statement fraud. This research design suggests regarding the reduction of the 
occurrence of financial statement fraud, less emphasis should be placed on audit 
committee independence, board composition and independent non-executive directors’ 
effectiveness.  
Keywords: Corporate governance, Financial statement fraud, Audit committee, Board 
Independent non-executive directors 
 
1. Introduction 
Businesses are always under the risk of fraud from different sources as they relate to the firm. 
Although most fraud perpetrated by external sources are usually massive and serious. However, this is 
mostly done in collaboration with insiders. Majority of the fraud cases recorded in organizations 
indicate that fraud performed at the management level have a stringent and breath-taking effect on the 
organizational goals. This can be empirically attested to by constant collapse cases of reputable 
corporations such as WorldCom to Enron and Cadbury, Oceanic Bank, Intercontinental Bank, Access 
bank and much more, exploring that the successful penetration of such malicious act was inspired by 
directly or indirectly by top management.[5] asserted that corporate fraud is the number one threat to 
business organizations which is also a reflection of ability (or the lack) of its managers and/or 
deficiencies in the corporate mechanism. Whenever this malicious act arises by organizations’ 
management it clearly depicts a failure in the existing corporate governance structure guiding its 
affairs, whereas these structures are in place to help moderate top management excesses. 
 
The collapse of Enron could be said to be the beginning of the serious financial scandals however, the 
series of corporate failures and distresses continue to grow daily.  Other notable companies affected 
are Cadbury, Cresta bank, Intercontinental bank, Oceanic bank, Parmalat, Northern Rock bank, 
Lehman Brothers, Nebraska bank, Etisalat, Skye Bank and Diamond Bank of Nigeria. Some of these 
organizations, for instance, Enron and WorldCom have obliterated billions of dollars in investor 
esteem while moving towards liquidation, [3]. There are several kinds of frauds however among all the 
kinds, the highest is financial statement fraud. This kind of fraud has the most critical money related 
effect on organizations compared to the several other kinds of fraud, [28]. Asides the monetary impact, 
such fraud has an effect on the reputation of the firm. Consequently,  Farrell and Franco (1999) opined 
that fraud related cost might be hard to appraise in light of the fact that not all misrepresentation is 
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found and not all extortion found is accounted for; in spite of this, various endeavors have been made 
to estimate fraud, [12] estimated that six percent of companies in the United States lost revenue in 
2002 due to financial statement fraud; 491 companies in Australia and New Zealand responded to the 
KPMG survey and it was discovered that half had encountered fraud costing $457 million, (KPMG, 
2004) 
[20] discovered that fraud relating to financial statement would prompt a decline in the market value of 
the firm and less of revenue for the company, investors begin to lose trust in the companies and the 
companies would find it difficult to obtain the financial resources needed. 
According to [39], corporate governance became a global phenomenon following the consistent 
collapses of eminent companies. [30] contends that poor corporate governance has prompted 
contradictions amongst board and management offering ascend to board quarrels; unsuccessful board 
oversight capacities; fake and self-centered rehearses among individuals from the board, 
administration and staff; the domineering impact of director or MD/CEO, particularly in organizations 
that have family-control. Poor corporate governance has additionally prompted frail inward controls; 
rebelliousness with set down inside controls and working systems. Different endeavors have been 
made towards handling this worldwide challenge with some of these endeavors being the institution of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, extreme legal penalty e.g. death penalty in some countries like China.  
The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IASB) in [15] clearly indicated in the 
International Standard on Auditing (ISA 240) that the most extreme duty regarding the recognition and 
aversion of money related articulation misrepresentation dwells with those accused of the 
administration of the organization ([16]; [40]. The weakness of corporate governance has provided 
incentives for financial statement frauds; the company is not a victim of financial statement fraud but 
an instrument used to perpetuate the fraud. 
Regardless of the different governance structures and frameworks, misappropriation of funds and 
alteration of financial reports in the interest of the management has remained prevalent in most 
developing economies including Nigeria [41]. Thereby making the subject matter attract extensive 
attention and reaction throughout the years because of the inexhaustible collateral damage draining the 
long-term success of companies; Financial statements are supposed to be reliable tools used by 
investors when making investment decisions and also used by the stakeholders of the company when 
appraising the financial performance of the firm [6]. 
When financial statement fraud occurs, the company is not the victim but rather the instrument of 
fraud; the perpetrators are within the firm, holding a sufficiently senior position to be able to browbeat 
other employees into participating in the fraud. Since financial statement fraud occurs within the firm, 
the best controls to counter it have to be within the firm with one of those counters being the 
establishment of corporate governance of the company. 
Based on the above problem, this study scrutinized the influence of Corporate Governance on the 
prevention and recognition of Financial Statement Fraud in listed firms in Nigeria. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
Numerous theories articulating and driving the aforementioned. However, this study would be 
evaluating the agency theory. 
 
2.1.1 Agency theory 
[39] explained that agency theory is a model employed to scrutinize the association amid management 
(agent) and shareholders (principal) in which the principal employs the agent to apply necessary 
measures to maximize the wealth of shareholders. According to [26] the agency connection exist were 
a firm owned by a party (the principal) gives the daily operations of its function to another party (An 
agent) to help direct in line with his or her expectations. This claim was further buttressed that such 
relationship is contractual and the managers (agent) must make decisions, carry out functions that 
corroborates owners’ expectations. The perspective of this theory is solely pinned on the deliberate 
need of an agent (director) to safeguard and always have the shareholders interest at heart. The theory 
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clearly takes its stand point on the premises that a relationship exists amid two parties in an ordinary 
phenomenon and it is expected that the agent (directors) who is charged with the responsibility of 
carry out daily activities or services execute them on behalf of the principal (owner) and not that alone 
but also to satisfy of the owner’s expectations [26]. 
In furtherance, [33] argues that the decisions made by the management are sometimes contrary to the 
interests of the shareholders.  
In achieving the objectives of this research, agency theory would be espoused in scrutinizing the role 
of corporate governance in the detection and prevention of fraudulent financial reporting. Furthermore, 
the theory helps explain the contractual association amid the managers (who are the preparers and 
manipulators of the financial statements) and the shareholders (who majorly rely on those 
information).  However, the assumption of the stewardship theory is unrealistic as it assumes the 
interests of the director (agent) would match the expectations of capital owners. The fraud triangle 
theory focuses only on the reasons for committing fraud. Therefore, the agency theory has been seen to 
best set the foundation for this study. 
 
2.2 Summary of Empirical Review 
[10] explored the link amid fraud in the financial statement and corporate governance of registered 
firms in Italy, spanning through the period of 2001-2011 with a sample size of 26 companies. The 
result shows that having an audit committee who confides their operations within the corporate 
governance codes stipulated in Italy have a higher proximity to reduce risk and the occurrence of fraud 
and the more audit meetings the more likely the reduction of risk occurrences. 
[43] scrutinized the association amid the structure of corporate governance and the probability of 
fraudulent financial reporting across 227 listed public companies in Malaysia for the period of 2010-
2011. This was done using an integration of Beneish M-score model and Altman’s Z-score model. The 
results of the analysis indicated that an effective corporate governance structure would reduce the 
possibility of fraud. 
[4] examined the impact of monitoring characteristics have on the financial reporting quality of oil 
marketing firms listed on Nigeria Stock Exchange for the period 2000-2011. The research discovered 
that separation of power, directors’ independence, shareholdings of  managers and audit committee 
independence significantly affect the quality of financial report of firms in the oil marketing in 
Nigeria.  
[37] carried out a research to analyze the influence of independence, knowledge and experience of 
members of the audit committee on financial reporting quality. Based on the research, it was 
discovered that the ineffectiveness of the independence, expertise and experience of the audit 
committee is the cause of ineffective performance of oversight functions. 
Furthermore, [16] investigated on how corporate governance affects the reduction of fraud in 
organisations. The research explored how corporate governance affect the level of fraud. Three salient 
roles were explored: internal audit (IA), internal control (IC) and external audit (EA). They were 
investigated based on three dimensions: existence, implementation and effectiveness. The result of this 
study shows that IA is the most significant tool for reduction of fraud among the three components 
used and also indicates effectiveness as the most significant dimension for the reduction of fraud. 
[7] explored the connection amid the combination of the board and financial statement fraud in 75 
companies in North Carolina. The mechanisms for measuring board composition were number of 
board members, audit committee and outside directors. The result of the analysis showed that audit 
committee had an insignificant association with fraud related to financial statement, though a larger 
board and an upsurge in the tenure of external directors would minimize financial statement fraud. 
[19] examined the association amid board characteristics, audit committee and earnings management. 
An adverse association was found between audit committee and abnormal accruals, an adverse 
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relationship was also found amid firm characteristic and abnormal accruals. The result depicts that 
board independence and a rise in the proportion of outside directors in the audit committee would 
reduce the manipulation of earnings. 
[27] investigated the degree to which directors and ownership features relate to earnings management. 
570 non-financial companies registered on Vietnam stock exchange spanning from 2010-2014. Result 
of the analysis showed an insignificant association amid the fraction of non-executive directors and 
manipulation of earnings. 
[25] explored the consequence of the features of audit committee on the quality of financial disclosure. 
The selected sample was 101 firms listed on the Nigerian stock exchange between 2010-2014. 
Multivariate regression was introduced to confirm the relationship. The result showed that the 
independence of the audit committee, financial knowledge and share ownership significantly influence 
the quality of financial reporting. 
2.3 Gap in Literature   
Based on the empirical review, numerous scholars have explored the association amid corporate 
governance mechanisms and the prevention of financial statement fraud. However, few studies have 
been carried out in Nigeria regarding the role of corporate governance in the prevention and detection 
of fraud; the few studies conducted in Nigeria have not explored non-financial firms. In lieu of the 
aforementioned lacuna this study would explore the non-financial companies registered on the 
Nigerian Stock Market. 
2.4 Development of Hypotheses 
Based on the inclusive outcomes from extant studies and theoretical pronouncement, the following 
hypotheses were stated in their null form: 
 
Hypothesis one 












This study engaged the panel data as the study requires collation of several data from several 
companies over a period of time. It is a quantitative technique of research used to test the feasibility of 
any association amid constructs. To examine the direction of association amid two or more constructs 
correlation matrix was employed to clearly explore the relationship amid the firm’s governance 
structure (independent variables) and financial statement fraud of listed consumer non-financial firms 
in Nigeria (dependent variable). Panel regression is then used to envisage the degree of variation amid 
the dependent and independent construct. Financial statement fraud of the non-financial firms was 
measured using the Beinish M-score model. This study therefore utilizes both descriptive statistics 
(such as means and standard deviation to describe and summarize the data) and econometric analysis 
using ordinary least square to perform the linear regression as often used in recent studies.  
The Beneish M-score model was used to discover the occurrence or tendency of firms to manipulate 
their financial statements. The Beneish model is presented mathematically as: 
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3.1 Population and Sample Size 
The population for this research work comprises of the 122 companies listed on Nigerian Stock 
Exchange between the time periods of 2012-2016, this period was chosen due to availability of data, as 
well as the implementation of IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standard), which brought about 
huge leap for financial reporting in Nigeria. The sampling technique utilized was stratified sampling 
which is appropriate when selecting a particular sector. The sample size of 12.2 was determined based 
on a sample size rule of thumb by John Curry (10% of population).  However, this was rounded up to 
20 samples. 
 
3.1.1 Model Specification and Variable Selection 
In an attempt to provide empirical evidences on the aforementioned objectives, (corporate governance 
and financial statement fraud), a linear regression model equation was used. The regression equation 
can be computed as : 
 
Explicitly, equation 1 can be well-defined as: 
Financial statement fraud = f (Corporate Governance) + c ……………………………………(2) 
To enhance a better predictability and analysis of the relationship existing between the two constructs, 
equation 2 can be expanded further by the introduction of the constructs of corporate governance, 
hence formulating Equation 3. Therefore, the equation becomes: 
Financial Statement Fraud = f (Audit committee; Board composition; Independent non-executive 
directors)………………………………………………………………………………………...(3) 
The above can be deduced to: 
 = +……………………………………………………………(4) 
Therefore, the OLS linear Regression Equation is:     
=++  + …………………………….…………..(5) 
Where, 
FSF= Financial statement fraud  
ACOMM= Audit committee i.e. audit committee effectiveness. 
BCOMP= Board composition, the proportion of foreign directors to the entire directorship base. 
= Coefficient of parameter 
= Error term 
 = Time coefficient 
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Source:-views 7 Output (2019) 
Table 2 shows a brief descriptive statistic of both constructs of the selected listed firms stating the 
average of the variables, the standard deviation, the minimum and maximum of variables used. 
The mean value of financial statement fraud of sampled firms stands as 4.458068 with a standard 
deviation of 2.040825 (based on the Beneish model). This shows an average of the sample firms 
manipulate their financial statements indicating that the deviation between the companies is quite 
large.   The Audit committee independence (ACOMMI) is ascertained by the amount of Independent 
non-executive directors in the audit committee. The above table depicts a mean of 11.37481, with 
maximum and minimum values of 66.66667 and 0.000000 respectively with a standard deviation of 
17.32094. This indicates that approximately 10% of the sample firms have an independent committee.  
Board Composition (BCOMP) was measured by the proportion of foreign directors on the board to the 
total number of the board. The mean value was 0.034541, the maximum value was 3, minimum value 
0 and the standard deviation was 0.310851. This indicates that 3% of the board of the sample size 
included foreign directors. 
 MSCORE ACOMMI BCOMP 
 Mean -4.458068  11.37481  0.034541 
 Median -4.846456  0.000000  0.002222 
 Maximum  5.195931  66.66667  3.000000 
 Minimum -12.80684  0.000000  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  2.040825  17.32094  0.310851 
 Skewness  0.712358  1.605078  9.486943 
 Kurtosis  9.513047  4.921469  91.00508 
 Jarque-Bera  172.2422  54.23895  31406.50 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 Sum -414.6003  1057.857  3.212272 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  383.1768  27601.38  8.889819 
 Observations  93  93  93 
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From table 3 above, it can be observed that the R2 which shows an approximate of 10% variations in 
the explainable construct are expressed by the explained construct, leaving the remaining 90% 
unaccounted for.   
Audit committee independence (ACOMMI) exhibited an adverse and insignificant association with 
financial statement fraud with a value of -0.730587, Board composition (BCOMP) had an optimistic 
and insignificant association with financial statement fraud with a value of 1.743918. FSIZE and 
LEVERAGE had t-values of -0.101338 and 0.278917 respectively, indicating an adverse and 
insignificant association for FSIZE and an optimist and insignificant relationship for LEVERAGE. 
Regarding the overall significance, the combined variables showed an insignificant association with 
the dependent variable with a probability (F-static) of 0.198530. 
 
3.1.2 Hypotheses Testing 
The verdict rule for accepting the hypotheses of this study is set at 5% level of significance and a t-
value of 1.96 therefore, the null hypotheses would be rejected if the value of probability (P-value) is 
less than 0.05 and the t-value less than 1.96, and the alternative hypotheses would then be selected.  
 
Hypothesis 1 
There is no significant association amid audit committee independence and financial statement fraud 
of listed firms in Nigeria. 
The outcome above reveal that audit committee independence had a t-stats of (-0.730587) and a p-
value of (0.4671) which is below the verdict rule benchmark. Hence, the study accepts the null 
hypothesis implying the independence of the audit committee has no statistical influence on financial 
statement fraud of the sampled companies.  
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There is no significant relationship between board composition and financial statement fraud of listed 
firms in Nigeria.  
The outcome above reveal that board composition holds a t-stats of (1.743918) and a p-value of 
(0.0848) which is below the verdict rule benchmark. Hence, the study accepts the null hypothesis is 
embraced connoting the absence of significant association amid board composition and financial 
statement fraud of registered corporations in Nigeria. 
3.2 Discussion of findings 
Based on the results, an adverse and insignificant association derived amid independence of audit 
committee and financial statement fraud, showing a report stat of (--0.730587) and a p-value of 
(0.4671). The finding aligns with null hypothesis and this outcome is inconsistent with the result of 
[37] and [4] who found an optimistic and significant association amid audit committee independence 
and the quality of financial reporting. This corroborates with [44] who demonstrate that manipulation 
of the earnings and fraction of outside directors has an insignificantly association. Therefore, the 
fraction of independent directors does not influence financial statement fraud because their function 
contributes little in monitoring the committee activities due to threat on independence, time 
constraints, and adequate information. The result of the analysis is consistent with that of [7] who 
found an insignificant relationship between audit committee and the possibility of financial statement 
fraud occurrences.  
The outcome suggests, an optimistic but insignificant association amid board composition and 
financial statement fraud of listed firms reflecting a t-stats of (1.743918) and a p-value of (0.0848). 
Hence the study rejects the alternative hypothesis H2 which connotes a significant association exist 
amid construct. This is consistent with the result of [8] who discovered a positive and insignificant 
association exist amid board composition and financial statement fraud.  
4.  Conclusion and Recommendations 
This study examined the association amid corporate governance and financial statement fraud of listed 
firms in Nigeria. The model was analysed using some companies registered on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange.  The empirical analysis concludes that the corporate governance mechanisms which 
included audit committee independence and board composition not significantly related to financial 
statement fraud. Although board composition has a positive relationship with financial statement 
fraud, but the result concludes that the relationship is insignificant.    
 The study therefore recommend that the board should focus more on other characteristics of the audit 
committee such as financial expertise as this may significantly reduce the occurrence of financial 
statement fraud. In addition, the study recommends that managers should focus more on the 
experience and other demographic characteristics of the board members to improve the quality of 
financial reporting. 
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S/N YEARS COMPANIES M-SCORE ACOMMI BCOMP 
1 Livestock 2012 -5.012111 0 0 
  2013 -0.8013553 0 0 
  2014 -5.4625893 0 0 
  2015 -2.3697291 0 0 
  2016 -5.5676578 0 0 
2 Guiness 2012 -5.9392472 0 0.004167 
  2013 -4.9317578 0 0.004167 
  2014 -4.1679453 0 0.003333 
  2015 -5.8475065 0 0.004167 
  2016 -6.3949612 0 0.001667 
3 BERGER 2012 -4.5721704 0 0.002857 
  2013 -4.8734897 0 0.002222 
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  2014 -5.134857 16.66667 0.001538 
  2015 -6.6952967 16.66667 0.002 
  2016 -6.1177236 33.33333 0.002 
4 Dangote cement 2012 -2.0088213 0 0.001111 
  2013 -2.8898037 0 0.001111 
  2014 -3.3903176 0 0.001667 
  2015 5.1959309 28.57143 0.0025 
  2016 -2.29052 50 0.002308 
5 Dangote sugar 2012 -3.7450687 0 0 
  2013 -5.5249995 33.33333 0.001111 
  2014 -5.498109 50 0.001 
  2015 -3.1211864 66.66667 0.001111 
  2016 -0.6750711 66.66667 3 
6 Unilever 2012 -4.4597989 16.66667 0.002857 
  2013 -3.9982307 33.33333 0.004286 
  2014 -5.1258762 33.33333 0.001429 
  2015 -3.2638602 16.66667 0.00375 
  2016 -2.1260876 16.66667 0.002222 
7 Nestle Plc 2012 -4.1136747 0 0.005 
  2013 -3.9684279 16.66667 0 
  2014 -5.6644788 16.66667 0.00625 
  2015 -4.7167199 16.66667 0.005 
  2016 -4.6425849 16.66667 0.005 
8 FMN 2012 -4.8847436 0 0.003571 
  2013 -4.7084118 0 0.002857 
  2014 -5.4404339 0 0.002857 
  2015 -4.6273586 0 0.003571 
  2016 -3.65718 0 0.003571 
9 PZ Plc 2012 -6.2247514 66.66667 0.0025 
  2013 -5.7198887 0 #DIV/0! 
  2014 -6.1423799 50 0.001818 
  2015 -2.33187 0 #DIV/0! 
  2016 -3.5807988 33.33333 0.001818 
10 Mobil 2012 -3.7409932  0 
  2013 -4.6002573 0 0.003333 
  2014 -4.1681998 0 0.003333 
  2015 -3.9387583 0 0.003333 
  2016 -1.31611 0 #DIV/0! 
11 Julius Berger 2012 -1.7985079 16.66667 0.004167 
  2013 -3.2614708 16.66667 0.004167 
  2014 -3.1478225 16.66667 0.004286 
  2015 -3.2461519 14.28571 0.004545 
  2016 -3.4168819 16.66667 0.004545 
12 CUTIX Plc 2012 81.802471 N/A 0 
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  2013 -3.0264458 N/A 0 
  2014 -5.6062271 25 0 
  2015 -5.8812243 50 0 
  2016 -3.8092384 0 0 
13 CHELLARAM 
Plc 
2012 -6.0229695 0 0.005714 
  2013 -1.4743607 0 0.005714 
  2014 -3.4209127 N/A 0 
  2015 -5.5026762 0 0.005 
  2016 -2.301273 0 0.003333 
14 CAP Plc 2012 -4.9961494 0 0 
  2013 -3.0670475 0 0 
  2014 -4.1298401 0 0 
  2015 -4.846456 16.66667 0 
  2016 -0.6079323 16.66667 0 
15 LEARN Plc 2012 -6.6691247 0 0 
  2013 -5.9212949 0 0 
  2014 -6.5488742 16.66667 0 
  2015 -1.6759891 16.66667 0 
  2016 -12.806841 16.66667 0 
16 Nascon Plc 2012 -5.1272036 0 0.001111 
  2013 -6.9339308 0 0.001111 
  2014 -6.1281851 0 0.002222 
  2015 -0.7565547 40 0.002 
  2016 -4.5319091 33.33333 0.002 
17 Honeywell 2012 -5.7218524 0 0.002222 
  2013 -5.6089255 0 0.002222 
  2014 -3.9909487 0 0.002 
  2015 -5.0611675 0 0.001429 
  2016 -5.0417033 0 0.002857 
18 NB 2012 -4.5562407 16.66667 0.004615 
  2013 -5.6059513 0 0.004615 
  2014 -5.4365375 0 0.004 
  2015 -6.2700223 0 0.00375 
  2016 -2.90116 33.33333 0.00375 
19 BOC GASES  2012 -5.48081 0 0.003333 
  2013 -6.46173 0 0.003333 
  2014 -6.70263 0 0.003333 
  2015 -6.37811 0 0.005 
  2016 -5.65519 0 0.0025 
20 FIRST 
ALLUMINIUM  
2012 -5.10748 0 0 
  2013 -5.20993 0 0 
  2014 -5.93121 0 0.003333 
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  2015 -1.63224 0 0.001667 
  2016 -2.957 N/A N/A 
 
